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CONFLATING HEALTH CARE REFORM WITH TORT REFORM
By: Steven M. Pavsner 1
The recent health care reform act encourages the States to develop 
alternatives to the traditional tort system for health claims to control health 
costs. Many alternatives have already been tried in the States, but none 
have succeeded, except in impairing access to the courts to redress medical 
negligence, particularly among disadvantaged groups. 
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the 
“Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” into law.2 
Turning aside years of  effort to blame rising health care costs 
on “lawsuit abuse” and to impose federal restrictions on state-
law tort claims as the solution, the Act instead calls on the 
States to seek alternatives to the traditional tort system for 
health care claims. This commentary looks at alternatives the 
States already have tried. It fi nds that none these alternatives 
have achieved their stated objectives, and all of  them have had 
a disparate impact on the most vulnerable among us.  
Specifi cally, the Act encourages the States to “develop 
and test alternatives to the existing civil litigation system as 
a way of  improving patient safety, reducing medical errors, 
encouraging the effi cient resolution of  disputes, increasing 
the availability of  prompt and fair resolution of  disputes, 
and improving access to liability insurance, while preserving an 
individual’s right to seek redress in court….”3  Toward that end, the 
Act authorizes the Secretary of  the Department of  Health and 
Human Services to award “demonstration grants” to States 
“for the development, implementation, and evaluation of  
alternatives to current tort litigation for resolving disputes over 
injuries allegedly caused by health care providers or health care 
organizations.”4  
The nexus between health care and tort reform is the 
alleged relationship between health care costs and a supposed 
increase in the incidence or size of  health claim verdicts.  The 
presumed mechanism for health care cost reduction (thus 
limiting medical negligence lawsuits) is the lowering medical 
liability damage payments. This would 
supposedly allow insurers to lower 
medical liability insurance premiums, 
which would reduce physicians’ costs of  
doing business, and allow them to reduce 
their service fees.  
Unfortunately overlooked is the 
fact that no convincing evidence exists 
to support the alleged relationship between health care costs 
and health care claims. Studies can be found to support the 
relationship, but the better-reasoned and methodologically 
superior studies are to the contrary.  In the “crisis” atmosphere 
created by tort reform proponents, it is easier to decry outsize 
verdicts than to review the studies. But anecdotal reports of  
outsize verdicts are irrelevant, in part because they are so rare 
and in part because they are rarely paid.  The traditional tort 
system has numerous safeguards against outlying verdicts, 
including remittitur, new trial, and appeal, which are commonly 
invoked to reduce outsize awards to appropriate levels.  It is 
therefore not surprising that numerous studies have shown 
that neither the incidence of  medical negligence suits, nor the 
size of  plaintiffs’ verdicts, has signifi cantly increased during 
the “insurance crisis,” much less at the pace with which liability 
premiums have risen.  
Nor have premiums decreased in States that have 
adopted “tort reform,” as compared to States that have not. 
To the contrary, insurers in States with tort reform have raised 
rates higher and faster than insurers in States without tort 
reform. The simple reason is that factors other than medical 
negligence verdicts drive premiums. Numerous studies 
demonstrate that liability insurance premiums are driven by 
insurers’ returns on the premium dollars they invest in the 
market, not by losses on the premium dollars they pay in 
claims.  But it’s easier for insurers to blame “litigious plaintiffs” 
and “greedy lawyers” than their own portfolio managers.   And 
why not take the easy path?  If  some members of  the public 
believe that their doctors are being driven out of  business by 
“lawsuit abuse,” they will carry that bias into the jury room 
and return defendants’ verdicts.  If  some legislators rely on the 
misinformation and enact limits on medical negligence claims, 
the insurance industry wins again.  
More than half  the States have experimented with 
a wide variety of  alternatives to the traditional tort system, 
relying on the presumed relationship between health costs and 
health claims. Existing alternatives include changes to when 
claimants may sue, hoops they must jump through before they 
may sue, what they may recover when they sue, from whom 
they may recover if  they win their suit, and what they pay for 
the chance to sue.    
Restrictions on when health claims may be brought 
include shortening limitations in general, limiting the “discovery 
rule,” or requiring minors’ claims to 
be brought before they reach majority. 
Hurdles to fi ling in court include 
requiring prior notice to the defendant, 
submission of  the claim to mediation or 
arbitration before fi ling, or preparation 
of  certifi cates and reports from doctors 
willing to testify against their peers as a 
precondition to fi ling in court.  
Once in court, some States restrict the amount of  
forensic work expert witnesses may perform, but the most 
popular alternatives to traditional tort law are limits on the 
amount or type of  damages that the injured party can recover. 
These include a cap on all damages, or a cap on non-economic 
damages (sometimes indexed to infl ation or time and sometimes 
not), a bar to punitive damages (usually by raising the standard 
of  proof  to “actual malice”), requiring that amounts awarded 
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for future damages be paid out over time as the future damages 
are incurred, and precluding proof  of  economic losses paid 
by a collateral source, such as a health insurance policy.  Juries 
generally are not told of  these limits, which are imposed in 
post-trial proceedings and can decimate the amount the jury 
intended the victim to receive.  States also have experimented 
with abolition of  the common law concept of  joint and several 
liability, and have instead required juries to apportion damages 
according to fault.  In such States, when substantial fault is 
assigned to an impecunious or under-insured defendant, the 
injured party recovers less than the full jury-awarded damages. 
Other changes have been made to the traditional tort 
system that affect an injured party’s ability to bring a lawsuit 
in the fi rst place, such as the reduction of  the contingent 
fee claimants’ counsel may charge for their services or the 
requirement that the injured party to pay defense fees if  the 
suit is lost.  Reducing plaintiff ’s counsel’s fees reduces access 
to the courts because as the reward for winning decreases, 
willingness to incur the risk of  loss also decreases, especially in 
health claims cases, which are particularly expensive and time-
consuming to pursue.  The abrogation of  the “American Rule,” 
which does not require losing plaintiffs 
to pay defendants’ attorneys’ fees, in 
favor of  “offer of  judgment” rules, 
which impose the winner’s attorneys’ 
fees on the loser, deter plaintiffs from 
fi ling  meritorious claims and raise the stakes much higher for 
prospective plaintiffs.   Insurers are far more able to bear this 
risk than individual plaintiffs, for whom loss of  the claim can 
mean fi nancial ruin.     
Of  course, many States employ different combinations 
of  these individual strategies to create their own unique variety 
of  “tort reform,” so there is no shortage of  “alternatives to 
current tort litigation for resolving disputes over injuries 
allegedly caused by health care providers or health care 
organizations.”  What is lacking, and what the demonstration 
projects authorized by the Act should focus on fi nding, is any 
alternative to the traditional tort system that reduces liability 
insurance premiums while preserving an individual’s access to 
the courts and spreading the burden of  tort reform equally 
among all litigants.  
None of  the many changes enacted in the States have 
reduced liability insurance premiums, except at the cost of  
also impairing the individual’s right to seek redress in court. 
This is particularly true of  children, seniors, racial and ethnic 
minorities, the economically underprivileged, and women. 
These already disadvantaged groups are disproportionately 
impacted by tort reform for a number of  reasons, including 
their lower earnings and the nature of  the injuries they suffer. 
Lost earnings can be a signifi cant component of  a 
claimant’s economic damages, and under virtually all of  the 
existing changes they are fully compensated.  Victims whose 
losses do not include earnings, or include them at a lesser level, 
may be equally compensated by juries, but their awards will 
have a greater non-economic component, which will then be 
reduced to the cap level.  As a result, groups with no earnings, 
such as seniors, or historically lower earnings, such as racial and 
ethnic minorities and women, receive less of  their jury awards 
than others.  The disparity is only exacerbated by reliance on 
historical race- and gender-based statistics to measure the 
loss.     
The nature of  the injuries suffered by these same groups 
also contributes to the disproportionate impact of  tort reform 
upon them.  Injuries resulting from obstetric or gynecologic 
care are common in medical negligence litigation, but the 
resulting verdicts for undiagnosed breast cancer or infertility 
or other peculiarly “female” damages are often expressed in 
larger non-economic than economic awards, and thus are not 
fully recovered in “cap” States.  The same is true of  a child 
who has to go through life scarred or maimed or of  a senior 
who is abused in a nursing home.  Infertility, disfi gurement, 
scarring, blindness, burns, loss of  a limb and chronic pain are 
some of  the many devastating injuries that cause enormous 
pain and suffering are properly recognized by an award of  
non-economic damages, and thus are not fully compensated 
under most tort reform regimes.  Indeed, in many such 
cases, the prospect of  receiving a lower 
percentage of  a reduced award obtained 
in a more expensive process has led 
victims and their attorneys to conclude 
that otherwise meritorious claims are not 
economically viable.  Wherever the economic component of  
the loss is relatively small, but the non-economic component 
is great, current tort reform measures heap injustice on top of  
injury.  
When victims are not fairly compensated, and 
vulnerable groups are disproportionately impacted, the whole 
system of  justice suffers.  A vibrant tort system is a founding 
principle of  our democracy, a deterrent to negligence, and 
an early warning of  recurring problems in our society.  The 
traditional tort system has its fl aws, but, to paraphrase Winston 
Churchill, it’s far better than any of  the alternatives yet 
devised.  
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